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SOME ALMOST FORGOTTEN COURTS OF MISSOURI
In 1855 our general assembly established the St. Louis Land court, and the
St. Louis Law commissioners courts; the former had jurisdiction in cases involving
the title to and possession of real estate, and the latter had jurisdiction in suits
against steam-boats and vessels. Two distinguished lawyers presided over those
courts, the Honorable Edward Bates, later attorney general in President Lincoln's
cabinet, was judge of the first name, and the Honorable Roderick E. Rombauer,
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During the forties, fifties and sixties the general assembly established courts of
common pleas at Brunswick, Cameron, Cape Girardeau, Clarkton, Hannibal, Joplin,
Kansas City, LaPlata, Louisiana, Moberly, Neosho, Otterville, Sturgeon, Tipton
and Weston. Such courts were established in towns that had greater population or
better railroad facilities than the county-seat. In 1867 courts of common pleas
were established in Lafayette, Ray, Davies and Pettis counties, having concurrent
jurisdiction with justices of th'e peace and with the circuit court; and probate
jurisdiction in the last three named counties. Then there were established courts
of common pleas in eighteen other counties. The St. Louis court of common pleas was
established in 1841, and the Honorable Montgomery Blair, later a member of Presi-
dent Lincoln's cabinet, was the judge. In Mississippi county a court was established,
known as the "Mississippi probate and common pleas court." Some courts of com-
mon pleas had jurisdiction in civil cases only, some in civil cases and misdemeanors,
but the Moberly court had jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases. The Hannibal
court, which was established in 1845, has jurisdiction in two townships in Marion
county in civil and criminal actions; and the court is a part of the tenth judicial
circuit. The Louisiana court, which was established in 1854, has concurrent juris-
diction with the circuit court of Pike county in civil actions in four townships;
and the court is a part of the thirty-fifth judicial circuit. The Cape Girardeau
court, which was established in 1851, has concurrent original jurisdiction with the
circuit court of Cape Girardeau county; and it also has concurrent original juris-
diction with the probate court of that county. The Cape Girardeau court has a
separate'judge. The Cape Girardeau, Hannibal and Louisiana courts are held in
the cities of Cape Girardeau, Hannibal and Louisiana respectively and they are the
only common pleas courts now functioning in Missouri. The Sturgeon court, which
was established in 1860, has original and concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit
court in civil cases, including partition suits, in some parts of Boone, Howard,
Audrain, and Randolph counties, and the judge of the ninth judicial circuit presides
over the court. An effort was made to abolish the Sturgeon court ini 1921, but
whether that effort was successful or not, lawyers and politicians differ. But for
fear the court has been legally abolished, lawyers do not bring suits in it, and the
court seems to be what an Audrain county lawyer termed it, "Functus officio." The
remaining courts of common pleas have long since ceased to function.
In 1873 the general assembly established the "Jackson special law and equity
court," and it was given jurisdiction in civil cases, except actions pertaining to real
estate, and it was required to hold two terms a year at Independence and two at
Kansas City. The Honorable Robert E. Cowen, a well known Jackson county
lawyer, later of St. Louis, was the judge. In 1879 the court was abolished.
The Missouri constitution of 1865, the "Drake constitution," provided that the
state, except the county of St. Louis, should be divided into not less than five
districts, and each district composed of not less than three judicial circuits, and in
each district a court to be known as the "District court," be established, which
should meet at such times and places as provided by statute, and that the judges
of the circuits of each district should constitute the district court. The constitution
(Vol. 9
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also provided for appeals from the circuit courts (except St. Louis) to the district
courts, and from the district courts to the supreme court. Pursuant to that con-
stitutional provision, the General Statutes of 1865 provided for six districts, in
which district courts should be held, twice each year, and for the appointment of
clerks and marshals. The statute further provided that the first district court
should be held at Jefferson City, the second at Cape Girardeau, the third at Spring-
field, the fourth at Macon City, the fifth at St. Joseph, and the sixth at St. Charles.
The circuits nearest each one of those cities constituted that district. The courts
functioned regularly and appropriations were made for the contingent expenses.
The supreme court, Vols. 42 to 48, mention the fact that cases were appealed from
the first, second and other districts, and many from the circuit and criminal courts
of St. Louis. In March, 1870, the general assembly submitted to the voters the
question of amending the state constitution by abolishing the district courts. In
discussing that question, a Randolph county lawyer said, "The district court is
worth no more than six wheels in a wagon." The people agreed with him, for at
the November election 1870, the district courts were abolished. In March, 1870, a
prominent physician of Boone county was convicted of murder and sentenced to
sixteen years in prison, when he took an appeal to the district court. Before his
case could be heard, the people abolished that court, so the physician was taken
to the penitentiary and began serving his term. His attorney, General Odon Guitar,
filed a petition in the supreme court, stating that the defendant had taken an appeal
to a court that existed, but that before his case could be heard, the court had been
abolished; that he was entitled to be heard on his appeal; and that the supreme
court then had jurisdiction of such an appeal. The supreme court took jurisdiction
of the appeal, set the case for argument and released the physician on bond. After
hearing the arguments, the supreme court reversed the conviction of the physician
and granted him a new trial, and at the next trial, the jury acquitted him. Then,
a few years later, that physician was shot and killed by another physician, and the
shooting occurred at the same place, and the same shot gun was used on both
occasions. And the former attorney for the deceased physician successfully defended
the physician who killed him.
N. T. GENTRY*
RECORDING OF THE ASSloNMENT OF AccouiNrs RECEIVABLE TO AVOID
A PREFERENCE IN BANKRUPTCY
The recent provision by the Missouri Legislature for the recording of the assign-
ment of accounts receivable" should be of great interest to all commercial bankers
and their counsel. There has been considerable unrest since the passage of the
*Attorney, Columbia. B.A. 1884; U. of Mo.; LL.B. 1888. Former judge of
Supreme Court of Missouri.
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Chandler Act in 1938 in these circles caused by the passage of the Chandler Act
in 1938 in these circles caused by the change which was made in the definition of
a preference under Section 60a of the Banruptcy Act.2
This Section, s as amended, reads:
"(a) A preference is a transfer, as defined in this Act, of any of the property
of a debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an ante-
cedent debt, made or suffered by such debtor while insolvent and within
four months before the filing by or against him of the petition in bank-
ruptcy . . the effect of which transfer will be to enable such creditor to
obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the same
class. For the purposes of subdivisions a and b of this section, a transfer
shall be deemed to have been made at the time when it became so far per-
fected that no bona-fide purchaser from the debtor and no creditor could
thereafter have acquired any rights in the property so transferred superior to
the rights of the transferee therein, and, if such transfer is not so perfected
prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy . . . it shall be deemed to
have been made immediately before bankruptcy." (Italics mine)
The emphasized portions of the above section were placed in the Act by the Chand-
ler Amendment. This change, coupled with the possibility that it would be con-
strued according to its literal wording, left bankers undecided as to the advisability
of the use of accounts receivable as security for commercial loans.
4
With the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Corn Exchange
National Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder5 case, all doubts were resolved against the
possibility of the liberal construction which had been placed upon the amended
section by the lower federal courts0 holding such assignments good on the theory
of equitable liens, and indicated that as the law stood in most jurisdictions at that
time an assignee of accounts receivable would stand the chance, if the assignor
were declared a bankrupt, of having such assignment declared to be a preference,
unless the assignee notified the debtor of the assignment. This method of accom-
plishing the necessary security has always been avoided on the ground that it
2. Neuhoff, Assignments of Accounts Receivable as Affected by the Chandler
Act (1940) 34 ILL. L. REv. 538; Note (1943); 18 J. N. A. REF. BANKR. 25; (1943)
Security Devices as Preferences under the Chandler Act (1942) 16 J. N. A. REF.
BANKR. 130; Hamilton, The Effect of Section Sixty of the Bankruptcy Act upon
Assignments of Accouists Receivable (1940) 14 J. N. A. REF. BANKR. 80; In re
Accounts Receivable Financing (1943) 108 Am. Banker 77; Hanna, Some Unsolved
Problems under Section 6 0a of the Bankruptcy Act (1943) 43 COL. L. REv. 58;
Snbedeker, Security Devises as Preferences under the Bankruptcy Act (1943) 8 Mo.
L. REv. 85; 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1943) 960; Note (1943) 29 CORN.
L. Q. 105.
3. 52 Stat. 869 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 96(a) (1940).
4. See note 2 supra.
5. 318 U. S. 434, 87 L. ed. 884, 63 Sup. Ct. 679 (1942).
6. Adams v. City Bank & Trust Co. of Macon, Ga., 115 F. (2d) 453 (C. C. A.
5th, 1940), 134 A. L. R. 1215, 1218 (1941); Girand v. Kimbell Milling Co., 116 F.
(2d) 999 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941). In re Talbot Canning Corporation, 35 F. Supp. 680
(Md. 1940); Associated Seed Growers v. Geib, 125 F. (2d) 683 (C. C. A. 4th, 1942).
[Vol. 9
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would tend to hurt the credit of the assignor unduly, as well as being quite a task
in many instances.?
This problem arose from the fact that in most jurisdictions under the common
law, it is possible for an assignee of an account receivable who fails to notify the
debtor to have his interest cut off in some manner or other, even though the assign-
ment is clearly good between the parties.8 In those jurisdictions, such as Missouri, 9
which follow the English view as laid down in Dearle v. Hall,'0 the assignee is
likely to lose his rights against the debtor to a subsequent assignee in good faith,
provided the subsequent assignee first gives notice to the debtor. This rule finds
its basis in the concept that the assignee of a chose in action receives only an equit-
able right from the assignor, and that by failure to give notice to the debtor, he
has left the way open to the assignor to commit a fraud by the subsequent assign-
ment."1
The other major group of jurisdictions take the position adopted by the RE-
STATEMENT OF CoNTRACTs,'1 2 known as the Massachusetts rule, to the effect that
the first assignee has a prior claim, unless the second assignee in good faith (a)
secures payment from the debtor, (b) obtains a judgment, (c) obtains a novation,
or (d) obtains an evidence in writing of the debt which can be enforced against
the obligor. These courts rely upon the proposition that when the first assignment
is made, the assignor thereafter has no rights or interest which can be transferred,
unless the assignee, by sleeping on his rights, allows the second, assignee to acquire
a new legal right against the debtor in place of his previously unenforceable claim.' 3
As against these two views, New York14 holds that regardless of the actions
of the assignor or subsequent assignees, no rights superior to the first assignee can
be acquired. They follow to the logical conclusion the rule of the second group
of courts, by holding that even though the second assignee should secure payment
7. See In re Accounts Receivable Financing (1943) 108 Am. Banker 1, p. 2.
8. For a discussion of this problem generally, see Notes (1924) 31 A. L. R.
876, (1937) 110 A L. R. 774; 2 WILLISTON. CoNmACrS (rev. ed. 1936) § 435;
Notes (1925) 13 CALIF. L. REV. 141, (1924) 24 COL. L. REV. 501, (1924) 37 HARV
L. REv. 1133, (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 767
9. Murdoch & Dickson v. Finney 21 Mo. 138 (1855).
10. 3 Russ. 1 (Ch. 1823).
11. Murdoch & Dickson v. Finney 21 Mo. 138, 139 (1855), which stated
"But if, after a chose in action is transferred by its owner, it is assigned a second
time, and the last assignee first give notice to the debtor of his right, his equity
will be superior to that of the first assigne who has neglected to give notice; for,
by such failure, the first assignee has enabled the owner of the chose in action to
commit a fraud by making another sale. The second purchaser, by enquiring of the
debtor, might have learned whether the debt had been transferred, or if notice of
the transfer had been given to the debtor, he, after such notice, would pay the debt
to another at his peril." (Italics, the court's).
12. RESTATEMENT, CoTrrACrs (1932) § 173.
13. Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Finance Co., 264 U. S. 182, 68 L.
ed. 628, 44 Sup. Ct. 266, 31 A. L. R. 867 (1924).
14. State Factors Corporation v. Sales Factors Corporation, 257 App. Div.
101, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 12 (1st Dep't. 1939); Superior Brassiere Co. v. Zimetbaum 214
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from the debtor, he holds such moneys in trust for the first assignee. Therefore, in
such jurisdictions alone (in the absence of statute) can an assignee of an account
receivable be secure against future purchasers in good faith from his assignor.
Prior to the Chandler Act, as a general rule these assignments were good as
against the trustee in bankruptcy if they were made contemporaneously with the
extension of credit, even though they were made within the four months prior to
the filing of the petition.15 The trustee, under Section 47a", stood in the position
of an execution creditor holding an execution duly returned unsatisfied, and al-
though the assignment stood to be uneffective against a subsequent bona-fide pur-
chaser from the assignor, they were good in most instances against any creditors
of the assignor.17
Even though the assignment was made within four months of the petition,
there was held to be an exchange of equivalents, and the estate of the bankrupt
was not diminished.' Of course, as to the assignment of future accounts to come
into existence, the general problem of validity appeared, as in Benedict v. Ratner,'0
but if otherwise valid, if they came into existence, and were appropriated to the
contract before the petition was filed, they were held to be good against the trustee
on the theory of "relation back." Under this theory, the transaction was still held
to be an exchange of equivalents and the title of the assignee would "relate back"
to the time of the assignment.20
Under the Chandler Act, however, the status of these assignments is entirely
changed. The assignment, even though made long before the four month period, by
the terms of Section 60a is deemed to be a preference if any bona-fide puirchaser
from the debtor or any creditor could thereafter have acquired any rights in the
property so transferred superior to the rights of the transferee therein, and if the
transfer was not so perfected, it is deemed to have been completed immediately
before bankruptcy.2 1 The law of the particular state becomes important since it
is the state law which is applied to determine the rights of a bona-fide purchaser
against such an assignment under the decision of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 22
15. Adams v. City Bank & Trust Co. of Macon, Ga., 115 F. (2d) 453 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1940), 134 A. L. R. 1215, 1218 (1941) cited supra note 6; Doggett v. Chelsea
Trust Co. 73 F. (2d) 614 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934).
16. 36 Stat 840 (1910), 11 U. S. C. § 75. (Amended by the Chandler Act
in 1938 52 Stat. 881, 11 U. S. C. § 110, now Section 70c).
17. In re Phillips' Estate 205 Pa. 525, 55 Ati. 216 (1903); 2 WILLISTON, CON-
TRAcrs (rev. ed. 1936) § 434; Note (1927) 52 A. L. R. 109.
18. Robertson v. Hennochsberg (W. D. Tenn. 1924) 1 F. (2d) 604.
19. 268 U. S. 353, 69 L. ed. 991, 45 Sup. Ct. 566 (1923).
20. Sexton v. Kessler & Company, 225 U. S. 90, 56 L. ed. 995, 32 Sup Ct. 657
(1911); Goldman Co., 79 F. (2d) 317 (C. C.A. 2d, 1935); Manufacturers' Finance
Co. v. Armstrong, 78 F. (2d) 289 (C. C. A. ith, 1935); In re Jenkins Corporation
17 F. (2d) 555 (C. C. A. 1st, 1927).
21. See note 3 supra.
22. 304 U. S. 64, 82 L. ed. 787, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938). Prior to this case,
the federal courts followed the Massachusetts view. See Salem Trust Co. v. Manu-
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As in the Corn Exchange Bank case, in those jurisdictions following the English
view a bona-fide purchaser from the assignor could get rights superior to the assignee
if he was the first to notify the debtor. Although the possibilities of such superiority
of interest are less in those jurisdictions following the RESTATEMENT view, as pointed
out in In re Vardaman Shoe Co.,23 C... exceptional situations are recognized in
which a subsetuent bona fide purchaser can obtain good title as against a prior
assignee who has not given notice." A preference results by applying the clear words
of the statute. Even though the assignment is made contemporaneously with the
extension of credit, unless notice is given at that time, the assignment is not entirely
perfected. Even though notice were thereafter given before the filing of the petition,
the "relation back" theory cannot be applied, for by the terms of Section 60a, the
transfer (of the account receivable) becomes completed at the time it became
perfected, which would then make the transaction a transfer "for or on account of
an antecedent debt." As stated by the Supreme Court in the Corn Exchange Bank24
case, the effectiveness of the transfer, as against the trustee, is to be tested, "... .by
the standards which applicable state law would enforce against a good-faith pur-
chaser. Only when such a purchaser is precluded from obtaining superior rights is
the trustee so precluded. So long as the transaction is left open to possible inter-
vening rights to such a purchaser, it is vulnerable to the intervening bankruptcy.
By thus postponing the effective time of the transfer, the debt, which is effective
when actually made, will be made antecedent to the delayed effective date of the
transfer and therefore will be made a preferential transfer in law, although in fact
made concurrently with the advance of money." Section 60b of the Bankruptcy
Act 25 allows the trustee to set aside these preferences if the creditor, at the time
of the transfer (which is the time it becomes effective) had ". reasonable cause
to believe that the debtor is insolvent."
This interpretation of the Chandler Act made the use of accounts receivable
as security for loans of questionable value without notification, and since such
notification is felt to be undesirable and impracticable in the case of a large number
of book accounts, 26 the one loophole in the wall thus erected has been taken ad-
vantage of by several states. 27 Since it is the state law which determines the validity
23. 52 F. Supp. 562, 565 (E. D. Mo. 1943).
24. 318 U. S. 434, 436, 87 L. ed. 884, 886, 63 Sup. Ct. 679, 681 (1942) cited
supra note 5.
25. 52 Stat 870 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 96 (1940), ("(b) Any such preference
may be avoided by the trustee if the creditor receiving it or to be benefited thereby
or his agent acting with reference thereto has, at the time when the transfer is
made, reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent.")
26. Neuhoff, Assignment of Accounts Receivable as Affected by the Chandler
Act (1940) 34 ILL. L. REv. 538.
27. Penn. Laws (1941) 606, 69 PA. STAT. (Purdon Supp. 1941) § 561;
Ga. Laws (1943) § 85-1803 as amended; Md. Laws (1943) c. 728; see Montgomery,
Review of Supreme Court Ruling on Assignment of Accounts Receivable (1943)
17 J. N. A. REF. BANKR. 119 (indicates that the following states have also passed
recent statutes: Ohio, OHio CODE (Supp.) §§ 8509-3 to 8509-6; Rhode Island, Act
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of the assignment against subesequent bona-fide purchasers, these states have pro-
vided by statute methods of perfecting such assignments against subsequent takers,
By most of these statutes,28 notice to the debtor will still perfect the assignment,
but additional methods are provided. The Rhode Island2o statute in effect seems
to adopt the New York rule, abolishing the necessity for notice, and making the
title of the assignee good without notice. Marylando and Connecticut3l have
adopted the same view. Pennsylvania32 and Georgia3 3 have provided for a notation
to be made on the assignor's books of accounts. Ohio 34 and California," have pro-
vided methods for the filing of notice which are public records.
The Missouri Legislature enacted a statute in the last session which is designed
to take care of this situation.36 By its terms, the assignment of accounts receivable
may be perfected against all subsequent creditors, assignees, and purchasers of the
assignor by (a) giving notice to the debtor, (b) filing notice of the assignment of
the accounts receivable with the Secretary of State, or (c) by taking the assignment
in writing within one year after notice has been filed, providing it remains un-
cancelled.
It seems profitable to consider it by Sections. Section 137 of the statute pro-
vides:
"Whenever any person, firm or corporation assigns by instrument in writ-
ing all or any one or more of his accounts receivable, including accounts
receivable represented by invoices or book accounts, credits, or non-
negotiable choses in action, as security for the payment to the assignee
thereof of any or all indebtedness theretofore, contemporaneously therewith'
or thereafter inccrred by the assignor to the assignee or by way of a bona
fide sale to the assignee for valuable consideration, the assignee may file in
the office of the Secretary of State of the State of Missouri at Jefferson City
a notice signed by both the assignor and the assignee in substantially the
following form:
NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT OF ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE
D ate ........................................
.................................... has assigned or intends to assign one or more accounts
receivable to .....................................................................................
This notice is to be field in accordance with the Statutes of the State
of Missouri providing for notice by such filing.
2S. Penn., Ga., R. I., Md., Conn., Cal. See note 27 supra.
29. See note 27 supra.
30. See note 27 supra.
31. See note 27 supra.
32. See note 27 supra.
33. See note 27 supra.
34. See note 27 supra.
35. See note 27 supra.
36. Missouri Laws (1943) 403.
37. Id. at 404.
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oI g I uu .................. ........... .................... 01l u .....................................................
Assignor. Assignee.
Street. Street.
City and State. City and State.
The assignor and assignee may, buf are not hereby required to (in addition
to the form of notice above provided for) file such itemized and detailed
information concerning the assigned accounts receivable as they may
agree upon. In the event such- detailed information is not filed of record
every assignor who shall join in executing a notice as above provided
shall, upon written demand of a bona fide creditor of said assignor, supply
to said creditor full information as to the transaction represented by said
notice."
It will be noticed that this statute provides that the writing, in statutory form,
shall cover all accounts receivable, of any nature, and the assignment for the pur-
pose of either security or sale. The burden is placed upon the assignee to file the
notice, although there is no requirement that the notice so filed contain any in-
formation with regard either to the amount of the assigned accounts or the nature
of the transaction for which they are assigned. This information may be filed, how-
ever, "as they (the parties) may agree upon." This, in conjunction with the last
sentence of the Section requiring th'e furnishing of information to creditors by the
assignor would seem to place the transaction out of the field of "secret liens"3 s
which the Supreme Court found to be the nature of such assignments under the
common law assignment without notice. The intention of Congress, said the
Court,39 in revising Section 60a was "with the contemplated purpose of striking
down secret liens." Of course, as will be seen in connection with Section 2 of the
Missouri Act, an alternative method of perfecting an assignment is the giving of
notice. The statute does not go farther than the clear requirement of the Congress
in this respect. If the detailed information is not filed, it appears that the only
person who can learn the nature of the transaction is a creditor of the assignor,
although the fact that an assignment of some kind has been made will be a matter
of public record.
Section 240 of the act provides the methods whereby the assignment may be
perfected as follows:
"All such assignments may be perfected in any one of the ways herein set
forth and upon being so perfected shall be enforceable against and valid and
binding upon all creditors of the assignor and all the assignees and all pur-
chasers who have not theretofore perfected their rights in one of said ways
herein provided. The ways in which such assignments may be perfected
as aforesaid are as follows: (a) by actual notice to the debtor owing the
38. 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1943) 967.
39. Corn Exchange Nat Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U. S. 434, 87 L. ed.
884, 63 Sup. Ct. 679 (1942) cited supra note 5, (Court quoting from H. R. Rep.
No. 1409, 75th Cong. 1st Sess. (1937) 30).
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assigned account receivable, even though no notice be filed as permitted
hereby; (b) by filing after such assignment a notice with the Secretary
of State as herein provided, even though actual notice be not given to the
debtor; or (c) by the taking of an assignment in writing within one year
after notice has been filed with the Secretary of State as herein provided,
which notice remains uncancelled at the time of the taking of such assign-
ment, even though actual notice be not given to the debtor. Nothing
herein contained shall give priority to an assignee who takes his assign-
ment with actual knowledge of a prior assignment"
In this Section lies the primary value of this statute. The assignment is apparently
still valid and binding between the parties and against anyone who takes notice of
a prior assignment in the absence of both filing and notice to the debtor. Also, the
common law method of protection (giving of notice) is retained, and the additional
method of filing is provided. Under the third method of perfecting the assignment,
apparently the filing of one notice will be effective to perfect any number of assign-
ments. It would appear from the words of the statute that it would only be neces-
sary to file one of these notices each year, and any number of assignments made
within that year would be effective thereunder. It would seem to be of value in
this situation. A is in the habit of borrowing on short term seasonal loans from B
bank. In contemplation .of this requirement for credit, and the desire upon the part
of A to assign his accounts receivable as security, the parties could at any time
execute and file the required notice with the Secretary of State. Thereafter, any
time within a year the assignments could be made with no further action in regard
to the giving of notice. The filing of notice would not tend unduly to hurt A in
the eyes of his creditors, for upon inquiry the exact amount of such assignments
could be furnished them. On the other hand, such filed notice would not tend to
degrade A in the eyes of his customers, due to the practical effect of the location of
the records, and the probability that they would not be consulted in the ordinary
course of events.
Section 341 of the statute provides for the keeping of the public records in the
office of the Secretary of State, and the issuance of a written report of the records
upon request. The fees to be charged are one dollar ($1.00) for each, filing, and
fifty cents (50c) for each written report or release.
Section 442 secures the debtor who has not been notified of the assignment
against double liability in case he pays the assignor or one claiming under him,
providing that such payments shall be held in trust for the assignee.
"If a debtor, without actual notice that an assignment of his account has
been made, makes full or partial payment of his debt, to the assignor or
to anyone claiming by, through or under the assignor, his debt shall be ex-
tinguished or reduced as the case may be. An assignor or anyone claiming
by, through or under him, who, after filing of such notice, receives full or
partial payment from the debtor or a return of any property which has
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receivable, shall immediately pay over to the assignee, if the assignee has
properly perfected his rights, all of the money or other property so re-
ceived, and until such payment has been made to the assignee the assignor
or anyone claiming by, through or under him, as the case may be, shall
hold said money and property in trust for the assignee."
It will be noted that in case the debtor has received actual notice of the assignment,
he is not protected in any payment to the assignor. The Section codifies the com-
mon law view as to the discharge of the debtor, and accepts the New York view43
of the rights of the assignee against the assignor or other person who recovers from
the debtor in the absence of actual notice.
Section 544 deals with returned merchandise, and provides that the rights of
the assignee shall not be prejudiced by any appropriation by the assignor, in these
terms:
"If merchandise sold, or any part thereof, is returned to or recovered by the
assignor from the debtor owing any assigned account and is thereafter
dealt with by the assignor as his own property, or if the assignor grants
to such debtor credits with respect to merchandise so returned or recovered
or makes allowances or adjustments to the debtor owing any assigned ac-
count with respect to merchandise sold, the rights of the assignee with re-
spect to any balance remaining owing on such account receivable and the
assignee's rights with respect to any other accounts receivable assigned
to him by the assignor shall not be invalidated, irrespective of whether the
assignee shall have consented to, or acquiesced in, such acts of the assignor."
This Section, in connection with Section 4, makes the assignment of accounts re-
ceivable arising out of the sale of goods effective by itself also to create a pledge
of the goods in case they are rturned by the purchaser (debtor of the account re-
ceivable). It has been recognized that the contract of assignment could provide in
terms for this pledge, and the pledlge has been recognized as good between the par-
ties provided the pledgee (assignee) took possession of the goods.45 Then, under
the theory of "relation back," the pledge was considered to have been made at the
time of the agreement, and thus not a preference under the Bankruptcy Act, so
long as possession was taken prior to the filing of the petition.46 Of course, the
law of the state is applied to determine the validity of the pledge,47 and as in
most jurisdictions a bona-fide purchaser from the pledgor would get good title in
spite of the equitable rights of the pledgee before possession was taken, such a
pledge is now susceptible to the requirement of Section 60a and would be regarded
as a preference. By the terms of the principal statute, however, any goods recovered
by the assignor are as a matter of law deemed to be held for the assignee, and no
43. State Factors Corporation v. Sales Factors Corporation, 257 App. Div.
101, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 12 (1st Dep't. 1939), cited supra note 14.
44. Missouri Laws (1943) 406.
45. Goldstein v. Rusch, 56 F. (2d) 10 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), aert. denied, 287
U. S. 604, 77 L. ed. 526, 53 Sup. Cto 9 (1932).
46. Sexton v. Kessler & Company, 225 U. S. 90, 56 L. ed. 995, 32 Sup. Ct
657 (1911).
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purchaser from the assignor being allowed to get rights superior to those of the
assignee, the pledge would seem to be good at the time of the assignment, and
not a preference under the Bankruptcy Act.
Viewed as a whole, the statute is designed to cover completely the subject of
the assignment of accounts receivable, and to abrogate the common law rule of
Deare v. Hall which has been well established in Missouri since the case of Afur-
dock & Dickson v. Finney4 was decided in 1855.
No cases have yet been reported in which this statute is relied upon. The case
of In re Vardaman Shoe Co.49 which was decided recently in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Missouri was based upon the common law
rules which applied before the passage of this statute, and followed the decision
in the Corn Exchange Bank case to declare the pledge of the accounts receivable
to be a preference where there was no notice to the debtor. If the provisions of this
statute are complied with, however, there is no reason to suppose that an assign-
ment of accounts receivable in Missouri as security for a loan will not be perfectly
valid and binding against the trustee in case the debtor becomes a bankrupt.
J. A. WR GHT
48. 21 Mo. 138 (1855).
49. 52 F. Supp. 562 (E. D. Mo. 1943).
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